ブックタイトルRecommendations to prepare for future mega-disasters in Japan
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Recommendations to prepare for future mega-disasters in Japan
making arrangements for accepting the international assistance on an ad-hoc basis onmany occasions.? International assistance during natural disasters undeniably has diplomatic implications.However, to avoid wasting good intentions of those offering assistance and to maximizeits benefit for affected populations, the Government of Japan should work further toimprove and innovate its way to receive and manage international assistance on variousfronts.(2) Issues emerged during the response to assistance after the Great East Japan EarthquakeThe GEJE caused damages in wide areas, severely affecting the capacity of local authorities.Thus, in the initial phase, the Government of Japan was unable to grasp the overallhumanitarian needs and determine which assistance was needed in which disaster-affectedareas. Moreover, it took time to coordinate between the central government and affectedlocal authorities, in terms of matching the international assistance offered and beneficiaries. Inaddition, both sides lacked knowledge and sensitisation about receiving international aid,including how to receive incoming rescue teams and awareness about possible risks ofproperty damages and accidents that could occur during the relief operations. Since Japanexperienced the Great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake, both the central government and localauthorities had assumed that they would receive international assistance. However, how theymanaged receiving international assistance during the GEJE was rather passive and ad-hoc.a. Issues in terms of efficient acceptance of assistance by reflecting the needs ofdisaster-affected communities? At the initial phase, it was difficult to consolidate all the necessary information becauseof massive and wide spread damages that were coupled with severe destruction of keyinfrastructures. The central government was unable to determine assistance needs,because the affected local authorities, that would normally be responsible for gatheringinformation about the damages and assessing the overall needs on the ground, wereoften unable to do so. Moreover, there was confusion about what kind of offers shouldbe accepted in the absence of a clear set of standards or criteria.? Partly due to diplomatic considerations, many rescue teams at various levels ofcompetencies showed up in the affected areas, including those that would had beendisqualified for international deployment in accordance with the INSARAG 3 standards,and those that were poorly equipped and short of running their operationsself-sufficiently. Some teams dispatched in the initial phase were small-sized, thusunable to fully demonstrate their teams’capability.? As for the material assistance, the Government tried its best to prioritise accepting theitems that matched with the needs most. However, it was unable to gain a3 The International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG), established in 1991, is a voluntary network ofcountries, including Japan, that are dedicated to international search and rescue operations during disasters andrelated operational coordination. Its objectives include standardising the capacity of search and rescue teamsdispatched to disaster affected countries, as well as strengthening their coordination capacity. The FieldCoordination Support Section, located within the OCHA Headquarters in Geneva’s Emergency Services Branch,functions as the INSARAG Secretariat.6