ブックタイトルRecommendations to prepare for future mega-disasters in Japan

概要

Recommendations to prepare for future mega-disasters in Japan

comprehensive picture of what was most urgently needed and where they were needed.Therefore, the Government response ended up being nothing more than passive,without issuing a consolidated appeal for international assistance. Based on the offers ofinternational assistance it received, the central Government contacted the affected localauthorities directly and individually, and asked what they needed and would acceptfrom the list of offered items. In the absence of a clear messaging from the Japanese,foreign governments and international organisations suggested a wide range of reliefitems. It is clear that this complicated the situation with significantly added timerequired for matching between the specific items offered and local authorities’needs. Infact, all the accepted items were not necessary essential for the affected populations’survival. It also took significant time for some countries to ship materials afterexpressing their support (up to 3 to 4 months). Nevertheless, once the willingness andreadiness to accept international assistance was confirmed with the local authorities,the delivery process that followed was basically smooth.? The Government of Japan had no common standards for receiving assistance by foreignarmed forces for disaster response. However, the U.S. forces played a crucial role inlogistics and to rehabilitate infrastructures, while the Australians also contributed to theair transport. On the other hand, it is unclear whether or not the Government of Japanwas fully made aware of the fact that the Israel medical team was part of its nationalarmed forces, and considered its legal status and implications of receiving such a team.? It took several days for the Government of Japan to decide on setting up a frameworkfor accepting and using cash donations from foreign governments and citizens 4 . In otherwords, it took considerable time before the Government of Japan had decided that theGovernment established a body that accepted such donations in itself. On note here isthat while the Government expressed its intention to accept all kinds of assistanceincluding personnel, material and financial assistance, the JRCS decided only to acceptfinancial support. In this regard, it is unclear whether the Government of Japan was ableto give persuasive explanations to the international humanitarian community about thedifferent stance it took from that of JRCS.b. Issues in terms of domestic coordination when accepting international assistance? In several cases, acceptance of rescue teams required extra time so as to ensureappropriate coordination at each stage. This included coordination at the level ofcontact points accepting offers (i.e. MOFA and embassies/diplomatic missions);coordination between affected municipalities and relevant ministries of the centralGovernment (with the involvement of the Emergency Disaster Response Headquarterssupported by a coordination team tasked specifically on the acceptance of internationalassistance); and coordination for practical preparation for receiving teams on-siteinvolving the Fire and Disaster Management Agency, National Policy Agency and theaffected prefectures and municipalities.? The Japanese Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) issued a noticeimmediately after the disaster struck and indicated that minimum medical servicesprovided in the disaster affected areas by those with foreign license of medical4 After consultations between MOFA and JRCS, the Government of Japan decided that since March 14 2011, itaccepted cash donations from foreign governments and citizens through JRCS.7