ブックタイトルRecommendations to prepare for future mega-disasters in Japan

概要

Recommendations to prepare for future mega-disasters in Japan

practitioners would not be deemed violation of the Medical Practitioners’Act in Japan.However, the MHLW did not clearly define the scope of medical services that foreignmedical practitioners were allowed to offer. Moreover, MHLW avoided making adecision on receiving international medical teams proactively, stating that it respectedthe affected local authorities’opinions.? Likewise the rescue teams, complicated coordination processes at various stages wererequired for accepting material assistance, causing long time before confirming the localauthorities’willingness to accept them. This included contact points accepting offersfrom overseas (i.e. MOFA and embassies/diplomatic missions), coordination withmunicipal governments by the Emergency Disaster Response Headquarters and itscoordination team, and coordination between prefectural governments and localauthorities. Moreover, the assistance needs had often changed by the time when reliefitems actually arrived on site, whereas there were always time lags for internationalshipping.c. Issues in terms of facilitating acceptance of international assistance operationally? The Government of Japan did not establish a single focal point for accepting rescueteams, but made arrangements with countries that offered assistance on a bilateralbasis. Therefore, the teams’travel from airports to the operation sites of the disasteraffected areas was not managed systematically 5 . Operational on-site coordination oftenrelied on the knowledge and capacity of the hosting local authorities and the supportingteams from Japan. MOFA dispatched liaison officers and they coordinated effectivelywith the affected local authorities. However, they were not necessarily well familiar withinternational relief operations. Therefore, there is room for improvement in terms ofallocating personnel who are familiar with relevant international guidelines under suchcircumstances. Moreover, foreign rescue teams completed their mission essentially attheir own discretion, because the Government of Japan did not declare termination ofthe search and rescue phase officially 6 .? The Government of Japan did not provide centrally controlled means of transportingmaterials from airports to disaster areas, such as vehicles, and it did not make budgetaryarrangements to the necessary cost for it, either. 7 As a result, the assisting countries5 Relevant UN guidelines stipulate that a disaster-hit country should establish a Reception and Departure Centre(RDC) located at the arrival point of international relief teams. According to the guidelines, the RDC’s primaryresponsibility is to register teams and provide them with situational updates, and other operational informationincluding domestic transport.6 International rescue teams normally end their operations and return home after the hosting governmentdeclares the“termination of the rescue phase.”7 Japan’s Disaster Relief Act stipulates that disaster response expenses can be financed from the national treasury.The share of prefectural contributions becomes lower for larger natural disasters. This provision could be applied tothe domestic transport of foreign aid, but this was not the case during the GEJE. This was mainly due to thefollowing reasons: The Disaster Relief Act respects the principle of decentralisation, thus expects prefectures to stepin when the capacity of the municipal governments is overwhelmed, and in which case the central government canprovide financial support. However, the acceptance of international assistance was negotiated directly between thecentral government and municipalities ? without the involvement of prefectural governments. In addition, theapplication of the Disaster Relief Act requires prefectures to follow certain administrative procedures with, thoughlimited, some cost implications. Thus, it was difficult for the municipalities to request the cost-sharing byprefectures as they were not directly involved in the decision to accept international assistance.Immediately after the GEJE stuck, the central government allocated 30.2 billion Yen from its reserve fund forFY2010 to procure and transport aid materials, and this was a governmental initiative beyond the traditional8