ブックタイトルRecommendations to prepare for future mega-disasters in Japan

概要

Recommendations to prepare for future mega-disasters in Japan

needed to make arrangement for transporting relief items themselves. Moreover,because means of transport were limited, certain materials needed to be stored atNarita or other airports temporarily. In such cases, it was not entirely clear whether theGovernment of Japan or assisting countries were responsible for securing suchtemporary storage facilities.? Collaboration between the SDF and the U.S. and Australian armed forces producedpositive results. However, the forces were not well informed of their mutual disasterresponse capabilities and their understanding on relevant procedures for mutualcoordination were not sufficient.d. Issues in terms of recognising risks associated with accepting international assistance? Fortunately, there was no major accident involving international rescue teams. However,it is not clear whether the Japanese domestic actors were fully aware of responsibilitiesrelated to (and their need to potentially responding to) possible damages to privateproperties and human beings. The latter included medical malpractice and treatmentnot conforming to Japanese standards, and injury or death of rescue team membersthat could happen during the relief operations, as well as in response to any of theseincidents.? It is uncertain whether the Government of Japan had adequately discussed in peacetimethe extent to which public health standards for food and medicine should be complied inthe time of emergencies 8 .e. Issues in terms of actively disseminating information to the international community by theGovernment of Japan? The UNDAC team deployed to Japan issued situation reports in English and almost onthe daily basis. WHO, IAEA and other organisations also released reports on the GEJEoccasionally. However, there was a serious lack of information shared by theGovernment of Japan with the world in foreign languages ? despite the certain level ofefforts made by the office of the Chief Cabinet Secretary. Japanese citizens and foreigncountries needed different types of information, but the Government was unable toprovide accurate information that was meant to meet the expectation of theinternational community swiftly.framework of the Disaster Relief Act. However, this funding was used for only a small portion of domestic transportof relief items provided internationally. This was because the allocated reserve fund was intended for aid materialsin general and not particularly designed for handling items arriving from abroad. To secure this funding, the centralgovernment had to match donor countries with recipient municipalities, and fix the departure points (e.g. airportswhere materials arrived from abroad) and final destinations (i.e. municipalities receiving materials) in Japan by theend of March 2011. This execution deadline was extremely tight. In addition, the reserve fund was only applicableto procurement and transport of materials for the three most seriously affected prefectures, namely Iwate, Miyagiand Fukushima. Other affected prefectures were requested to comply with the normal provisions of the DisasterRelief Act.8 International disaster-response laws, rules and principles (IDRL), which the International Federation of Red Crossand Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) and other international organizations encourage countries around the world toadopt, also require the protection of public health and environmental benefits in disaster-hit countries. The IDRLalso stipulate that medicines provided to disaster-hit countries must be those permitted in both the providing andreceiving countries.9