ブックタイトルRecommendations to prepare for future mega-disasters in Japan
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Recommendations to prepare for future mega-disasters in Japan
overall needs of disaster affected communities.? The Government of Japan prioritized accepting“good intentions”of foreign countries asmuch as possible over considering more proactive utilisation of international assistancein a way that supplements the domestic response efforts. As a result, an approach, thatallowed the country to accept international assistance in an effective and efficient whilealso taking into account associated risks, cost incurred and the time lag, way wasmissing.? As an international practice, an aid recipient country is expected to comprehensivelygrasp, evaluate and communicate the impact of assistance it received. However, theGovernment of Japan had no institutional set-up or framework to meet such anexpectation, and it could not become a model to other countries in terms of fulfillingsuch accountability.b. Plans were short of necessary details ensuring their effective implementation? Acceptance of international assistance is mentioned in Japan’s Basic DisasterManagement Plan. Japan also had plans outlining the roles and responsibilities ofrelevant Ministries as well as general steps to be followed by them. However, they didnot include detailed procedures, such as mechanisms for decision-making andinter-Ministerial consultations.? There was no SOPs 13 , detailing the operational requirements for accepting personnelfrom their arrivals at airports until their return to home countries, or for acceptingrelief items including temporary storages, means of transport means, and cost-sharing.There was also no plan detailing who coordinates the international assistance once theyarrive on site and how to do it.c. The present institutional set-ups are not necessarily conducive for accepting internationalassistance efficiently? When international assistance is offered in the forms of either rescue or medical teams,it makes sense that the Government notifies its acceptance to the assisting countriesafter confirming the intention of local authorities with the verification of the assistanceneeds on the ground. However, when local authorities themselves were severelyaffected - as was seen in the GEJE - it took long time before such a decision was made assufficient information was not available. Moreover, it is difficult to determine withwhom the responsibility associated with the acceptance of international assistance lies,especially when an unfortunate incident such as discussed above happens.d. Lack of simulation exercises assuming the acceptance of international assistance? Although relevant Ministries had an inter-Ministerial agreement for acceptinginternational assistance, they never had simulation exercises with the participation of allthe relevant actors. Consequently, inexperienced staff had to respond to the GEJE.? The SDF had conducted joint military exercises with the U.S. forces for many years, butthey had not been designed for disaster response. As a result, the SDF and the U.S.forces had to cooperate without knowing capabilities of each other and clarifyingprotocols for operational coordination.13 Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)11