ブックタイトルRecommendations to prepare for future mega-disasters in Japan
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Recommendations to prepare for future mega-disasters in Japan
necessarily reflect the idea to guarantee minimum standards in terms of assistance forthose in need, nor do they articulate the Government’s accountability in meeting suchstandards. While municipalities normally play central roles in disaster response, the firstresponders at the local level are not familiar with the international minimum standards.It is probably too much to expect from the local aid providers to adopt the internationalminimum standards to their work rather directly.? Under such circumstances, Japanese humanitarian practitioners, who should have beenfully familiarised with the international norms and standards, appear to have made littleattempt to apply them to their aid operations and to adjust them to the contexts of localareas affected by the GEJE. Therefore, bearing in mind the future risk of large scaledisasters, disaster management practitioners and institutional aid providers need todebate what should be the minimum standards to be set and applied for Japan in thelight of existing international standards. This is essential for ensuring appropriateassistance that takes into account various protection risks and assistance needs ofpopulations affected by a disaster, and for protecting lives and dignity of the mostvulnerable populations. Such a comprehensive discussion should take place betweenthose involved in international aid and domestic disaster response.(2) Issues emerged during the response phase of the GEJE? Various approaches that are now considered international practices were not adopted.Such approaches include human rights-based approach, gender mainstreaming, theSphere standards, and tested needs assessment methodologies. Many problems couldhave been avoided if these had been applied on the ground. In reality, however, neitherinstitutional aid providers nor affected populations had the mindset to take advantageof these standards and tools to the response to the GEJE, in which context socio-culturalelements were also considered to have come into play. However, when the affectedpopulations and local aid providers were explained about these norms and standardsafter the response operations were over, they were apparently receptive and foundthem useful.? No integrated information management system was developed at the pre-disasterphase, which could help capture various needs of the affected populationscomprehensively and collect, analyse and disseminate the relevant data systematically.Such a system should include use of standardised formats for needs assessments anddeployment of trained personnel who can engage with the affected populations and areequipped with appropriate interview techniques. As a result, this hindered aidprioritisation based on clear evidences at each phase of the disaster cycle; developmentof assistance plans geared towards achieving common minimum standards ofassistance; and swift and flexible response to diverse and ever-changing needs byallocating available resources most efficiently .? NGOs could not accomplish their roles in terms of protecting the vulnerable populations.The NGOs could potentially contribute to ensure that international minimum standardswere met, by complementing local authorities’efforts to assist those who were hard tobe reached. However, NGOs’role has not been well recognised or defined in Japan.Given the Japanese Government’s solid institutional capacity, it was difficult for the civilsociety organisations to provide humanitarian assistance together with local authorities22