ブックタイトルRecommendations to prepare for future mega-disasters in Japan

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Recommendations to prepare for future mega-disasters in Japan

manner. Consequently, those compiled the information admitted that the extent thatthe information was shared and utilised for a coordination purpose was rather limited.? Furthermore, there was no overall coordination system that allowed NGOs and NPOs tocooperate with each other and coordinate their activities on a significant scale. Duringthe initial emergency phase, they found it particularly difficult to coordinate or shareinformation on their activities with a view to avoid overlapped assistance as thesituation on the ground unfolded. While many NGOs with experience in internationalhumanitarian operations participated in the response to the GEJE, they had notestablished relationships with NPOs focusing on disaster relief at the domestic level.Reportedly, there were some cases where the absence of effective partnerships,combined with difficulties in terms of coordination, even caused frictions among NGOsand NPOs. A small number of donors, NGOs, NPOs and other aid providers attemptedto hold inter-agency meetings, but the extent of information sharing at the level ofTokyo was rather limited, thus did not result in effective on-site operationalcoordination or development of common strategies. In some prefectures andmunicipalities, a limited number of groups coordinated their activities within specificsectors such as education and temporary housing, but even this form of coordinationwas limited to a few sectors and in certain affected areas.? The JPF and the Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC) worked toserve as contact points to coordinate the acceptance of incoming assistance byinternational NGOs. However, the information channels of the supply side multipliedand drawing a comprehensive picture of the assistance needs on the ground wasdifficult. Thus, they found it difficult to match the offers of assistance with the needs ofthe disaster-affected communities smoothly. If these intermediary organisations are toaccept and manage offers of assistance to be made by international NGOs, theypresently face many challenges in terms of available human resources, their know-howas well as systematic coordination with other organisations.? Many private companies assisted the populations affected by the GEJE, involving aidworkers and relief items from overseas. The size and impact of the assistance providedby the private sector were particularly notable, playing a crucial role in distributing foodand other relief items immediately since the on-set of the disaster. The companiesdispatched their employees on a voluntary basis to the disaster affected areas, andprovided assistance building on their own core businesses. However, their CSR activitieswere often not embedded in any of the coordination systems that had been worked outat the level of disaster-affected communities, and this was a challenge in terms ofdelivering effective assistance. Therefore, , and ways should be explored to leveragetheir contributions more effectively, given the concerns of the considerable overlap ofassistance and wasting of resources during the GEJE, in the absence of a coordinationmechanism to capture the overall situation of disaster relief, including with theinvolvement of these private actors.? As described in the previous section (Part II, 2-1), NGOs are normally required to complywith international standards that are applied to humanitarian assistance, such as theSphere standards, Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP), and the Code ofConduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in29